Financing Confederation Revisited: The Economic State of the Federation by Robin Boadway et al.
 
Financing Confederation Revisited                  37 
 
 
     
 
Financing Confederation Revisited: 














This festschrift for David Slater coincides with the twentieth Anniversary of 
two important events in Canadian fiscal federalism: the completion of the 
Economic Council of Canada’s landmark study entitled  Financing 
Confederation and the passage by Parliament of what would become the 
Constitution Act, 1982. David was the Chair of the Economic Council at the 
time, and as such was responsible for what is arguably the most influential 
and lasting of the Council’s projects. By apparent coincidence, the publication 
of Financing Confederation coincided with the coming into force of the 
Constitution Act. While the Constitution Act is perhaps better known for 
repatriation of the constitution and the implementation of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, it also included a rather far-reaching set of principles 
governing the relative roles and responsibilities of the federal and provincial 
governments in delivering social policies. Although these principles are no 
more than that, their elevation to constitutional status gives them a special 
standing as ideals against which our federal fiscal arrangements should be 
judged. Remarkably, Financing Confederation provided the economic justi-
fication for at least some of these principles, and explored their implications 
for the design of the fiscal arrangements. 
This paper takes a brief retrospective view of the development of the 
fiscal arrangements in light of the principles enunciated in both these  
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documents. In particular, we consider the consequences of the substantial 
fiscal decentralization that has occurred in the past 20 years for the achieve-
ment of the objectives set out in these principles. We use as our benchmark 
not only the principles enunciated in Financing Confederation, which have 
stood the test of time, but also the relevant principles of the Constitution Act. 
In particular, we might remind ourselves of the content of Section 36, entitled 
Equalization and Regional Disparities, which states: 
 
(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the 
provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the 
exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, 
together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments, 
are committed to  
  (a) promoting equal opportunities for the well being of Canadians;  
  (b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportun-
ities; and  
  (c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all 
Canadians.  
(2) Parliament and the Government of Canada are committed to the 
principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial 
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable 
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.  
 
This section not only commits the federal government to the principle of 
a strong form of equalization, but also essentially makes the federal govern-
ment jointly responsible for the delivery of important social policies. Other 
relevant aspects or interpretations of the constitution for the fiscal arrange-
ments include the assignment of powers, in particular, the exclusive provin-
cial legislative responsibility in the areas of education, health and social 
services; the spending power, which includes the right to make conditional 
transfers to the provinces as well as targeted transfers to individuals and 
institutions; and the surprising absence of the assignment of responsibility for 
maintaining and promoting efficiency in the internal economic union, which is 
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Principles and Values 
 
 
This is an exercise in policy evaluation, and as such, the perspective that we 
take is unabashedly a normative or prescriptive one. Policy evaluation and 
advice necessarily involves value judgements. This issue is the extent to 
which one’s policy stances ought to be conditioned by positive considera-
tions, in particular by political feasibility. This is especially important in fiscal 
federalism, given that many of the conflicts that constrain policy 
implementation are political in nature. Nonetheless, we take the view, as did 
the authors of  Financing Confederation, that economic policy analysis 
should not be unduly constrained by considerations of political feasibility. To 
do so would be to eschew that which economists are best prepared to 
contribute. At the same time, it should be recognized that the design of the 
fiscal arrangements cannot be based solely on economic considerations. 
There are obviously other issues involved that non-economists are in a better 
position to judge, and that may in the end be more telling. 
The normative approach involves adopting some normative principles or 
objectives and investigating their implications for policy. This means we must 
make clear what one’s societal value criteria are. We take as our basic 
economic objectives the following three: economic efficiency, redistributive 





The criterion of efficiency is taken for granted by economists. It refers 
broadly to the exploitation of all gains from trade, both those that can be 
obtained best through markets and those that require collective action. From 
the point of view of fiscal federalism, one can identify three relevant ways in 
which economic efficiency is relevant.  
The first involves  efficiency in the internal economic union. This 
requires that there be free and non-distorted flows of goods, services, labour 
and capital across the borders within the federation. This can only be 
achieved if lower level governments do not engage in actions that, 
intentionally or otherwise, impede cross-border flows. This is a very difficult 
principle to fulfill, and almost certainly will be violated to some extent. The 
essence of federalism is that lower level jurisdictions be able to enact policies 
within their spheres without restraint. These policies will almost certainly 
impinge upon cross-border flows. The challenge is to devise a system 
whereby distortions are the result of legitimate policy objectives, such as  
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social policies or the protection of language and culture, and not the result of 
protectionism at the expense of other provinces. 
The second involves the efficient provision of public goods and services. 
Some of these will be national in nature and others of a regional or local level. 
Moreover, some will be public in nature, some will involve infra-structure, 
and others will take the form of services to individuals or firms. Their 
efficient provision is a challenge because their allocation is outside the market. 
The quest for efficient provision of public goods and services is one of the 
main arguments for the decentralization of expenditures in a federation. 
The third efficiency issue in federal systems is one that was emphasized 
in Financing Confederation, and is referred to as fiscal efficiency. The issue 
arises as a direct consequence of the decentralization of fiscal responsi-bilities. 
This brings with it differences in the need for public services and the fiscal 
capacity to finance them across jurisdictions. These differences can imply 
that otherwise identical persons receive different benefits per tax dollar in 
different jurisdictions, referred to as net fiscal benefits (NFBs). These NFB 
differences provide incentives for households and firms to relocate based on 
fiscal considerations rather than productivity. Such fiscally-induced migration 
will cause economic activity to be allocated inefficiently across provinces.
1 
                                                             
1This source of inefficiency in a federation was first identified by Buchanan (1952). 
Its application in a Canadian context was due to Graham (1964), and formalized in Boadway 
and Flatters (1982a). 
Given the importance of NFBs for the design of the fiscal arrangements, 
it is worth dwelling briefly on their relevance and some caveats for policy 
purposes. First, it should be noted that NFB differences arise across 
jurisdictions only to the extent that public services are not financed by benefit 
taxation. The latter would imply that benefits are reflected in individual taxes 
so there can be no systematic differences in NFBs across provinces. The 
evidence is fairly convincing that services provided by provincial and local 
governments are, in fact, redistributive, in which case regions with higher 
resources are able to provide services at lower tax rates. Given that, NFB 
differences will arise from differences in the ability to raise revenues at given 
tax rates, as well as differences in the need for public services because of 
demographic differences. Differences in the cost of providing public services 
are not, however, sources of NFB differential that lead to fiscal inefficiency. 
Second, there is an issue with respect to the empirical relevance of 
migration induced by differences in tax rates or spending programs across 
jurisdictions, which is mixed. Watson (1986) had argued, based on the 
empirical estimates of Winer and Gauthier (1982), that the efficiency cost 
was very low. However, that has been challenged in a recent paper by Wilson 
(2000) who argues that when one takes a stock rather than a flow perspective  
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with respect to migration, the efficiency cost of fiscally induced migration is 
much higher. Others argue that the impact of NFB differentials on migration 
will be muted to some extent by capitalization into land prices. In short, the 
empirical evidence is not convincing one way or the other, especially when 
one considers that only labour migration is studied and not the movement of 
business activity more generally. However, it turns out that the case for 
equalizing NFB differentials does not rely solely on fiscally induced migration. 
A key part of the Financing Confederation argument was that fiscal equity 
arguments also call for equalization. 
Finally, it should be noted that most arguments for equalization are based 
on static modes of analysis. There is growing realization that the development 
of regions in an economy may be influenced by agglomeration effects and 
other externalities, and these could have important implications for 
equalization and other transfers. This is yet unexplored terrain, and it is not at 
all obvious what the implications for equalization might be. On the one hand, 
to the extent that equalization causes economic activity to be spread more 
thinly across the country, the benefits of agglomeration are not being 
exploited. On the other, equalization might induce regions to develop more 
quickly precisely by reinforcing local agglomeration effects where they might 





Redistributive equity encompasses what public finance economists tradi-
tionally refer to as vertical equity. However, it has come to be interpreted 
more widely in recent years. One can think of there being three dimensions of 
redistributive equity, all of which are objectives of government policy.  
The first of these is equality of opportunity, to which Section 36(1) draws 
attention. This can be thought of as an ex ante objective. The aim is for the 
public sector to offer redress for the different opportunities that households 
face to participate in the economy. Thus, youth are educated and trained to 
upgrade their skills and talents. Given that different persons are born with 
different abilities, equality of opportunity can be interpreted as requiring that 
society compensate to some extent for differences in abilities. But, of course, 
there are efficiency costs involved so equality of opportunity is bound to be 
less than perfect. 
This leads to the second dimension of equity, equality of outcomes. This 
takes the form of ex post redistribution, such as through progressive taxation, 
income-tested or targeted transfers, and in-kind transfers.  
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The final form of redistribution is social insurance, which as the name 
implies is insurance offered by the public sector. This encompasses not just 
insurance in the usual meaning of the word, but also compensation for bad 
luck that is otherwise uninsurable privately, such as that resulting from bad 
demographic luck, ill health, unemployment and other misfortunes that are 
deemed not to be the responsibility of the person. Major social programs like 
unemployment insurance, disability benefits, workers’ compensation, and 
health care fall into this category. 
The relevance of redistributive equity for fiscal federalism should be 
evident. Virtually everything governments do at all levels have redistributive 
consequences. Moreover, some of the most important policy instruments 






The criterion of horizontal equity is widely accepted as an objective of 
government policy. However, its logical extension to a federal setting is 
contentious. Horizontal equity requires that persons who are equally well off 
in the absence of government ought to remain so after government policy. In 
other words, persons in comparable circumstances ought to be treated com-
parably by the government. Of course, there will be conceptual difficulties in 
determining who are equally well off, especially given differences in 
preferences and need among households, as well as differences in family size. 
For our purposes, we need not enter that debate; much income tax policy 
debate revolves around such issues. We can presume that there is some 
measure of real income or ability to pay that suitably reflects one’s economic 
well-being.  
 
In a federalism context, horizontal equity takes on special, and somewhat 
demanding, importance: persons of a given real income ought to be treated 
comparably no matter where they reside in the federation. This can be 
viewed as a form of equal treatment or fairness — everyone counts with the 
same weight in society’s social welfare function — and can be interpreted as 
a natural consequence of citizenship. Two things should be emphasized. The 
first is that horizontal equity is compatible with any degree of vertical 
redistribution, and in that sense there is no conflict between the two 
objectives. Indeed, as noted below, there is no conflict between horizontal 
equity and efficiency either: in fact, the two are complementary.  
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Second, in a federation, it will not be literally possible, or desirable, to 
achieve horizontal equity to the fullest. That would require provinces and 
municipalities to apply exactly the same tax and expenditure policies, which is 
obviously inconsistent with the idea of federalism. Instead, horizontal equity 
must be compromised to a federal setting. One way of doing so, which is 
compatible with the views of Financing Confederation, is to ensure that all 
provinces have the potential to satisfy horizontal equity. This means that they 
must have the fiscal capacity to provide comparable levels of public services 
at comparable levels of tax rates, so they could, if they so choose, satisfy the 
requirements of horizontal equity. At the same time, they should not be 
compelled to provide exactly the same public service levels and have the 
same tax/transfer structures. (Of course, there may be reasons based on 
efficiency and redistributive equity why some harmonization of policies is 
desirable.) The objective of horizontal equity in potential terms has come to 
be referred to as fiscal equity.
2 Like fiscal efficiency, it is achieved by 
equalizing NFBs across provinces, precisely the prescription found in Section 
36(2). 
                                                             
2The concept of fiscal equity is due to Buchanan (1950).  Financing 
Confederation and Boadway and Flatters (1982b) proposed a restricted version of fiscal 
equity referred to as narrow-based fiscal equity as an attempt to take account of the 
presumed property rights of provincial residents in their own jurisdictions. 
Not all economists will agree with the above objectives. And, even if they 
do, they will not agree with the prescriptions. There are three main sources of 
disagreement. The first is that different economists will make different 
judgements about the relative weight to be given to equity versus efficiency. 
Moreover, they may not accept the values embodied in the principle of fiscal 
equity, that is, equal treatment of comparable citizens no matter where they 
reside. Unfortunately, alternative principles are not readily found in the 
literature, though presumably they have to do with some notion of differences 
in property rights depending on where one resides. The second source of 
disagreement concerns one’s views of the benevolence of government. The 
less benevolent the government is thought to be, the less willing might one be 
to have the government involved in the economy, including in its 
redistributive functions. Roughly speaking, those who put low weight on 
equity and low weight on benevolence tend to prefer government to be 
smaller and less redistributive. They will also tend to favour decentralization 
as a brake on both intervention and redistribution. Finally, economists may 
disagree with the way the markets work, especially the severity of the trade-
off between equity and efficiency. This too can lead to different views of the 
role of government, but differences that are less ideologically charged.  
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Whatever one’s views of the role of government, the incontrovertible fact 
is that much of what governments do through their budgets — especially that 
which is controversial  — is redistributive in nature and intent. This is 
reflected in the most important policy instruments used. These include the 
progressive tax system, including transfers administered through the tax 
system; targeted transfers to the needy; social insurance programs (un-
employment insurance, workers’ compensation, pensions, disability); health-
care expenditures; education and training. These comprise a substantial 
proportion of what governments do, and are of critical importance to the 
fiscal arrangements, given the shared responsibility between the federal 




Federalism and Decentralization 
 
 
The essence of federalism is decentralized decision-making, although this is 
by no means restricted to federations. The arguments for decentralization of 
fiscal responsibilities are well known and widely accepted among economists. 
The big issue is how to manage the consequences of decentralization. 
The alleged benefits of decentralization can be briefly summarized. They 
amount largely to improving the efficiency of delivering public services. 
Lower jurisdictions can cater to local needs and preferences. They are better 
informed about these needs and preferences as well as about local cost 
conditions, which they are better able to control. So-called agency costs 
arising from the imperfect ability to monitor service deliverers are less, and 
layers of bureaucracy are reduced. Innovation is enhanced by decentralized 
provision by independent units of government. And, efficiency and account-
ability improvements are induced by decentralization and the competitive 
federalism that accompanies it. These arguments apply especially to the 
delivery of local public goods, the delivery of services to households and 
firms, and the delivery of targeted transfers. These include many policy 
instruments that are of importance from a redistributive point of view. 
It is important to note that the benefits of decentralization apply largely to 
the expenditure side of the budget. There are no particular benefits to 
decentralizing taxation, except perhaps those based on accountability. Indeed, 
while many multi-level governments decentralize the provision of public 
services in the key areas of health, education and welfare, the decentralization 
of revenue-raising varies widely across countries (and even within them with 
respect to provincial-local fiscal arrangements). In other words, countries  
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have a wide variety of discretion in the extent of the so-called vertical fiscal 
imbalance (VFI). The decentralization of revenue-raising responsibility in 
Canada  — and the effective VFI  — is probably the greatest in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries.
3 
This leads us to the potential costs of fiscal decentralization, including the 
decentralization of both spending and taxing decisions. These can be grouped 





Three sorts of efficiency effects of decentralization of fiscal responsibility can 
be identified. The first are distortions in the internal economic union simply 
because of uncoordinated or different policies that affect cross-border trade in 
labour, capital, goods and services. These reflect fiscal externalities arising 
from tax or expenditure competition: policies implemented in one province 
will affect the well-being of households in other provinces either directly or 
indirectly through its effect on provincial budgets.
4 Such externalities can be 
positive, such as when one province provides public services that benefit 
residents of neighbouring provinces. These fiscal externalities often provide a 
basis for policy harmonization and/or federal intervention. Negative 
externalities are more pervasive, and include such things as tax distortions on 
interprovincial trade, beggar-thy-neighbour policies, residency restrictions for 
the use of public services, and policies of discrimination or local protection. 
Some of these reflect legitimate policies of a social, linguistic, cultural, 
environmental, or labour standards nature and must be simply taken as a cost 
of federalism. They may also represent legitimate differences in provincial 
preferences over tax-transfer policies. In fact, as in the international sphere, it 
is hard to distinguish protection from legitimate social policy, which is why it 
has been very difficult to implement effective free trade within the internal 
economic union, or to achieve an understanding of the role of the federal 
government in fostering efficiency in the internal economic union. 
                                                             
3One must be cautious in interpreting statistics on the VFI. Some countries, like 
Germany, might appear to have a low VFI because of revenue-sharing agreements that direct 
a proportion of federal revenues to the states. However, revenue-sharing is really a form of 
transfer because the states have no individual discretion over their amount or structure. 
4A taxonomy of fiscal externalities and how they affect the efficiency of resource 
allocation may be found in Dahlby (1996).  
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The second source of inefficiency is a relatively newly discovered 
phenomenon referred to as vertical fiscal externalities.
5 This refers to the fact 
that provincial level fiscal decisions have effects that spill over onto the 
federal government, and thereby to residents of other provinces. For example, 
an income tax increase in one province reduces the tax base and thereby 
causes federal tax revenues to shrink. This is a cost of revenue-raising that is 
neglected by the province and leads to an incentive to over-expand. The 
overall consequences of this are not obvious. Vertical fiscal externalities work 
in a direction that offsets horizontal tax competition, so it is not obvious that 
on balance it is a bad thing. Nor is it clear how the fiscal arrangements can 
overcome them, except perhaps by either limiting the extent of 
decentralization of revenue-raising responsibilities to the provinces or 
implementing effective tax harmonization agreements. 
                                                             
5Canadian economists especially have been involved in their study, including 
Boadway and Keen (1996); Dahlby (1996); Boadway, Marchand and Vigneault (1998); 
and Dahlby and Wilson (2000). For a general survey of vertical fiscal externalities and their 
relevance, see Keen (1998). 
The third source of inefficiency is what we have referred to as fiscal 
inefficiency. Recall from above that decentralization in itself entails that 
different provinces will have different capacities to provide public services to 
their citizens because of differences in tax capacity and need. Given that the 
activities of provincial governments are redistributive in nature (rather than 
being based on the benefit principle), differences in NFBs will arise that 
provide a purely fiscal incentive to economic activity to gravitate towards 
more advantaged provinces. This is a critical efficiency effect for the fiscal 
arrangements, since it is one that can readily be corrected without 
compromising the integrity of the federation. A system of unconditional 
equalizing transfers can effectively undo NFB differences and thus facilitate 
the very process of decentralization. The more decentralization there is, the 
greater is the need for fiscal equalization (but also the more difficult it may be 
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Equity 
 
Decentralization can have parallel effects on the extent and structure of 
redistribution policies implemented by the various levels of government in a 
federation. Evaluating these effects is much more tenuous than in the case of 
efficiency since additional value judgements are involved. As in the case of 
horizontal fiscal externalities, interprovincial competition for business activity 
and for tax bases can result in a competing down of redistribution policies. 
Provinces have an incentive to attract higher income persons and firms at the 
expense of lower income ones or those who are likely to be heavier users of 
public services. The extent to which this competing down of redistribution 
(the co-called race to the bottom) occurs in practice is more a matter of 
anecdotal evidence than substantiated analysis.
6 As well, the influence of 
vertical fiscal externalities tempers horizontal competition effects. To the 
extent that the costs of redistribution can be shifted to the federal budget, 
provinces will be induced to over-redistribute, and this latter effect can 
dominate if transfer-recipients are relatively immobile. 
                                                             
6There is, however, some strong evidence that provincial welfare policies respond 
to incentives introduced by federal shared-cost versus block-funding. See the recent study by 
Baker, Payne and Smart (1999). 
Whether or not these fiscal externalities induce too much or too little 
redistribution, different provinces are almost certainly likely to adopt different 
standards of redistribution with respect to various groups. As we have argued, 
redistribution policy is multi-faceted, and relies on a variety of policy 
instruments. It would be surprising if different provinces adopted similar 
structures. The consequence is that from a national point of view, needy 
persons of a given type in different provinces may face very different 
standards of redistribution, potentially violating the notions of equal 
opportunity, reduction in economic disparity and the availability of public 
services of reasonable quality set out in Section 36(1).  
Whether one should be concerned with differences in standards of 
redistribution across provinces is a matter of judgement. It could certainly be 
argued that the essence of federalism is that different provinces should be 
able to choose their own standards of redistribution. At the same time, this 
might be tempered by the fact that these differences may simply reflect the 
consequences of fiscal competition. It might also be argued that citizenship in 
a nation implies some minimal expectation of reasonably comparable 
treatment in different jurisdictions, as set out in Section 36(1). This is 
obviously a debate that is well beyond economics.  
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One remaining equity consequence of decentralization is less susceptible 
to concerns about the nature of federalism and the desire for autonomy by 
provincial governments in their own spheres of legislative authority. As we 
have stressed, decentralization inevitably results in differences in fiscal 
capacity and need across provinces. If these are not addressed citizens in 
different provinces will receive different levels of service for given tax rates. 
In addition to providing incentives for inefficient fiscally induced migration, 
these also result in fiscal inequity. This, along with the complementary 
principle found in Section 36(2), provides a strong case for full equalization of 
fiscal capacities across jurisdictions. Equalization is in a sense the 
quintessential instrument of federalism. It equips the provinces with the ability 
to provide comparable levels of public services to their citizens at comparable 
tax rates, without at the same time compelling them to do so. It thus 
represents a healthy compromise between achieving horizontal equity and 




                                                             
7Another role of equalization is sometimes stressed, and that is its role as a risk-
sharing device. It effectively acts as a form of insurance against adverse shocks to provinces’ 
tax bases. This was not stressed in Financing Confederation, but is in no way inconsistent 
with equalization as a device for addressing fiscal efficiency and equity. 
The Fiscal Arrangements: Can They Deliver?  
 
 
Standard fiscal federalism theory holds that the fiscal arrangements represent 
the means by which decentralization can be facilitated, while at the same time 
the costs of decentralization are contained, the principles of the constitution 
are fulfilled, and the responsibilities of the federal government in achieving 
national objectives are accomplished. The greater the amount of 
decentralization, the more important are the fiscal arrangements, but at the 
same time the more difficult and challenging their task.  
The extent of decentralization in Canada has evolved dramatically over 
the past four decades, especially since the years of fiscal restraint in the early 
1990s. For example, the proportion of public spending (excluding inter-
governmental transfers) attributable to the provinces and their municipalities 
went from 47 per cent in 1961 to 61 per cent in 1999. Over the same period, 
the provincial share of total revenues went from 40 per cent to 53 per cent, 
and federal transfers as a share of provincial revenues declined from 22 per 
cent to 13 per cent. This change has been accompanied by a change in the 
structure of federal-provincial transfers. Equalization payments doubled in the 
1980s from about $3.6 billion to $7.3 billion, while block grants for health,  
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education and welfare rose by about 70 per cent from about $8 billion to 
$13.5 billion. In the 1990s, equalization rose by much less, from $7.3 billion 
to $8.5 billion, partly reflecting the fiscal retrenchment at the provincial level. 
At the same time, block transfers for health, education and welfare actually 
declined from $13.5 billion to $12.5 billion.  
As mentioned, provinces in Canada now have much more fiscal 
autonomy than in virtually any other federation in the world. It can be 
presumed that this decentralization is virtually irreversible; indeed, it seems to 
breed further decentralization. The issue is whether the fiscal arrange-ments 
can cope with this degree of fiscal decentralization. To me this is an open 
question. 
Much depends upon the view one takes of the role of the federal 
government. The constitution provides some limited guidance here. The 
legislative powers of the federal government are not controversial. What is 
controversial is how these powers — especially taxation, regulation and the 
spending power — are used in areas that overlap with provincial legislative 
responsibilities. Some guidance is found in section 36, which as we have seen 
gives the federal government some responsibility for ensuring that equality of 
opportunity and the provision of basic public services apply across the 
country. However, this does not clearly specify the role of the federal 
government in achieving either efficiency in the internal economic union or 
national equity. And, it is not just a matter of agreeing to these objectives as 
goals of government. One can vigorously argue for national efficiency and 
equity as legitimate objectives of government, but at the same time take the 
position that the federal government is not primarily responsible for achieving 
them.
8 Our position, which is consistent with that taken by Financing 
Confederation, is that the federal government has a legitimate interest in 
national efficiency and equity objectives, and that without federal initiative it 
is unlikely that these objectives can be suitably addressed. 







                                                             
8Indeed, some might argue that they are objectives that could be achieved by 
collaborative provincial action, with minimal participation by the federal government. The 
position taken by Courchene (1996) is close to that.  
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Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 
 
In virtually every multi-level system of government, including federations, 
higher level governments collect more in revenue than they need for their 
own program expenditures. This is true with respect to the federal 
government and the provinces in Canada, as well as with respect to the 
provinces and their municipalities. Interjurisdictional transfers, of course, 
balance this VFI. In itself, t he existence of a VFI between the federal 
government and the provinces reduces the incidence of fiscal externalities, 
contributes to harmon-ization of tax and transfer policies, avoids excessive 
fiscal imbalance, without at the same time necessarily reducing provincial 
responsibility in the areas of provincial legislative responsibility. But it does so 
largely by making the federal government preponderant, allegedly at the 
expense of provincial autonomy and accountability. Moreover, this 
preponderance lends itself to the possibility that the transfers used to close the 
VFI are used in ways that expose the provinces to the uncertainly associated 





Equalization is the sine qua non of fiscal decentralization, and is also present 
in virtually every multi-level system of government. Its purpose in the 
Canadian federation is twofold. First, from a constitutional point of view, it is 
meant to fulfill the principles of both parts of Section 36 of the Constitution 
Act. That is, it redresses the differences in fiscal capacity that come about 
simply from fiscal decentralization (the equalization principle of Section 
36(2)), and it facilitates the ability of provinces to achieve the objectives set 
out in Section 36(1). Second, by redressing fiscal capacity differences, 
equalization avoids the fiscal inefficiencies and fiscal inequities that would 
otherwise arise, a position well documented in Financing Confederation. 
There has been much debate about the relevance of these problems, and 
a large literature has developed.
9 Some allege that fiscal inefficiency is 
empirically unimportant. More important, others do not accept the value 
judgement on which the notion of fiscal inequity is based, essentially a notion 
of equal treatment of citizens regardless of where they reside. Suffice it to say 
that it is the principle that underlies Section 36(2), and, it seems to be a 
natural extension of the notion of citizenship and equal treatment. It is a 
                                                             
9See the recent overview in Boadway and Hobson (1998).  
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principle that does not detract from the responsibilities meant to be enjoyed 
by the provinces. And, it applies whatever one’s views about the redis-
tributive role of government. In short, it is a very powerful principle, and one 
that is widely accepted. 
 
The Spending Power 
 
The spending power represents the only realistic policy instrument available 
to the federal government to achieve its presumed responsibilities for 
efficiency and equity in the economic union, and its joint constitutional 
responsibility with respect to redistributive equity (Section 36(1)).
10 In much 
of the economic literature, its use is taken for granted. As with equalization, 
the spending power is also a widely used instrument in all federations around 
the world, and usually with less controversy (Watts, 1999). It has been found 
by the courts to be a constitutionally valid federal policy instrument (Hogg, 
1996), and it underlies some of the most important federal social policy 
initiatives, including refundable tax credits, grants to various institutions 
including universities, the Canada Health and  Social Transfer, shared cost 
transfers, and even equalization. 
Its use is not without difficulty, quite apart from concerns of a political 
nature. It can be viewed as intrusive and unpredictable, especially if it is used 
in intrusive and unpredictable ways! While there is nothing inherent in the 
spending power that requires that it be used unilaterally, unpredictably and 
without adequate consultation, detractors argue that since the instrument is 
ultimately a federal legislative power involving budgetary spending, it is prone 
to such problems. Not surprisingly, there is a constant search for alternatives 
that might avoid these difficulties. The main alternative is negotiation and 





Interjurisdictional agreement over the structure of tax or expenditure policies 
is an alternative to the spending power, with or without the connivance of the 
federal government. It is not the only alternative, but others would be even 
                                                             
10In principle, the federal government could use its power of disallowance to cajole 
the provinces into conformity. But that is clearly an unrealistic alternative to the spending 
power. Other alternatives that involve collective federal-provincial decision-making are 
discussed below.  
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less palatable than the spending power. These include the use of federal 
mandates, the power of disallowance, or resort to the courts. Examples of 
these occur in other federations around the world, but it seems clear that they 
would be unacceptable in our decentralized federation (and they were not 
seriously considered in Financing Confederation).  
We have had some mixed experience in Canada with policy harmoniza-
tion. There have been various tax collection agreements that have served to 
harmonize various taxes between the federal government and several 
provinces. These include the highly successful income tax collection agree-
ments, which have been widely regarded as model forms of tax harmoniza-
tion. Harmonization of sales taxes has been much less widespread, but has 
enjoyed some success with the Quebec Sales tax and the Harmonized Sales 
Tax in three of the Atlantic provinces. The federal-provincial agreement on 
child tax credits can be regarded as successful, as can the Canada Pension 
Plan. On the other hand, the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), intended to 
bring some order to interprovincial trade, is notable for its lack of bite. And, 
the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA) changes the status quo 
relatively little. It is notable that the main successes among these agreements 
occur when the federal government uses it spending or taxing power as a 
carrot or stick. 
Canada has been a bit of an innovator in the use of federal-provincial 
agreements, perhaps being driven by the imperatives of decentralization. The 
extent of success remains to be seen. There are two grounds for being 
sceptical about the efficacy of federal-provincial agreements as means of 
achieving national policy objectives. First, negotiating a successful agree-ment 
can only be done with unanimous consent. Not only is that difficult to do with 
ten to fourteen governments involved, by its nature it implies that such 
agreements cannot involve any redistribution among provinces. That rules out 
effective agreements involving national equity considerations. Second, to be 
effective, such agreements must have a means of enforcement — a so-called 
dispute settlement mechanism  — and that must be binding. The most 
successful agreements have been the tax collection agreements, and that has 
been because the federal government was effectively able to induce the 
provinces into participation because of the disparity in tax room that existed 
when the agreements were negotiated. It is instructive that these agreements 
are undergoing a considerable transformation as the balance of tax room shifts 
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Tensions Resolved versus Tensions Created 
 
 
The past four decades have witnessed a gradual decentralization in fiscal 
responsibilities to the provinces, a trend that was abruptly accelerated in the 
early 1990s. Our federation is now the most decentralized federation in the 
world. The proportion of subnational government revenues that come from 
own sources is the highest among all federations. The subnational share of 
total government expenditures is also among the highest. And, provinces in 
Canada exercise more actual discretion over their own spending than in other 
federations, where mandates, conditionality and federal oversight are often 
the norm. Some of this decentralization has been a result of conscious policy. 
But, most of it has occurred piecemeal as the cumulative result of a series of 
decisions taken as part of the budgetary process, and in response to fiscal 
pressures that have had little to do with fiscal federalism. Indeed, it could be 
held that the process of decentralization itself fed centrifugal tendencies rather 
than the reverse. In other words, decentralization has done more to create 
tensions than to resolve them. 
There are many signs of strain in virtually all aspects of the federal 
system. The following list is intended to indicate the strains that now exist in 
the system. 
 
Equalization. Most seriously, the equalization system and the will to maintain 
it are in peril, at the same time that fiscal disparities are more likely to rise 
than to fall. The latter is an inevitable consequence of the gradual 
decentralization of revenue-raising responsibility to the provinces: for a given 
pattern of per capita tax bases across provinces, fiscal capacity differences are 
greater the larger is the amount of revenues raised by the provinces. The 
equalization system is no longer comprehensive, and is unable to cope with 
the huge disparities arising from oil and gas revenues. The current system 
does not even accomplish what Financing Confederation referred to as the 
narrow-based approach to dealing with resource revenues. It suffers from a 
number of structural defects that are likely to be more s erious as the 
federation becomes more decentralized. For example, equalization is based 
solely on revenue-raising capacity, whereas disparities in the ability to provide 
reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable 
levels of taxation can arise because of different demographic compositions of 
provincial populations. These differences in the need for public services are 
components of equalization in many other countries (e.g., Australia, South 
Africa, Japan, Scandinavia). Proposals that are now on the table, such as  
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moving to an apparently simpler macro formula, are unlikely to resolve the 
underlying problems. 
 
The Spending Power. As the VFI has fallen, the federal government has 
effectively lost control of the spending power. This means that there is no 
effective mechanism by which they can exercise their responsibility for 
pursuing equality of opportunity and for maintaining reasonable standards of 
quality in public services. There are many who would argue that this is a good 
thing, but so far there is no effective alternative in place for achieving national 
equity objectives. 
 
The Economic Union. Nor is there a mechanism for maintaining the integrity 
of the internal economic union. There are signs that both national equity 
standards and the efficiency of the economic union are beginning to erode. 
Examples can be found in provincial tax policies (tax holidays, preferential 
treatment for provincial residents), education policies (differential fees, local 
preferences in university admissions, preferential tax treatment of provincial 
scholars) and welfare policies (waiting periods and rate reductions). Inter-
national free trade has itself enhanced the incentives for provinces to engage 
in tax competition, expenditure competition and beggar-thy-neighbour policies 
with respect to one another. 
 
Tax Harmonization. The income tax system is becoming disharmonized, and 
provinces seem to be engaged in competitive reductions in income tax 
progressivity. Attempts at harmonizing the sales tax system have been stalled, 
and are unlikely to make any headway in the near future. 
 
Cooperative Solutions. Attempts at arriving at cooperative solutions by 
federal-provincial negotiation have not been very successful. We have 
discussed above the fact that the most successful negotiated arrangements 
seem to be in circumstances in which enforcement is implicitly achieved by 
the federal power of the purse.  
 
It may well be that the decentralized Canadian federation will evolve into 
one in which provinces behave “cooperatively” with respect to national 
objectives of efficiency and equity. After all, provinces do not take their 
decisions in isolation. However, there is little evidence that we are evolving to 
such a cooperative outcome. Perhaps the time has come for an updated 
version of  Financing Confederation. Unfortunately, we now lack the 
Economic Council of Canada from which the original wisdom emanated. As 
well, we lack institutions such as the Commonwealth Grants Commission in  
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Australia or the Financial and Fiscal Commission in South Africa that could 
do the job. These bodies have the mandate to take a longer run view of the 
evolution of their respective federations, one that is at arm’s length from the 
year-to-year budgetary problems of the central government. In both cases, 
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